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INTRODUCTION
[1]
The Hatch-Waxman Act provides a mandatory thirty-month stay
on the Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) approval of an Abbreviated
New Drug Application (ANDA) when a patent infringement suit is filed.1
The Act includes a provision for a district court to shorten or extend the
Act’s thirty-month stay on FDA approval if “either party to the action
failed to reasonably cooperate in expediting the action”2 (hereinafter “the
modification provision”). The federal district courts have on the whole
been very conservative in their interpretation of the modification
provision.3 The district courts have, to date, seldom exercised their power
∗

J.D., Columbia University School of Law, 2009; B.S., Georgetown University, 2006.

1

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2006).

2

Id.

3

See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 557 F.3d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir.
2009) (Prost, J., dissenting); Gerald Sobel et al., Hatch-Waxman Litigation from the
Perspective of Pioneer Pharmaceutical Companies, in PATENT LITIGATION STRATEGIES
HANDBOOK 183, 197 (Barry L. Grossman & Gary M. Hoffman eds., 2d ed. 2005).
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to alter the obligatory thirty-month stay.4 In a recent case, Eli Lilly v.
Teva, the Federal Circuit held that a district court’s decision to modify the
statutory thirty-month stay is within the discretionary powers of that
particular district court, may be based on a party’s uncooperative
discovery practices before the court, and will only be reviewed for an
abuse of discretion.5 In the wake of the Eli Lilly decision, it is now likely
that the modification provision will become more liberally interpreted and
frequently invoked by some of the district courts.
[2]
Part I of this article provides an introduction to the Hatch-Waxman
Act, the legislative history of the modification provision, and some
discussion on the market incentives that pioneer pharmaceutical
companies have to extend the statutory thirty-month stay. Part II covers
the facts of the Eli Lilly v. Teva decision, a case in which the Southern
District of Indiana used the modification provision to prevent the generic
defendant Teva from launching its ANDA product to compete with Eli
Lilly’s Evista product before the start of the parties’ trial. Part III of this
article surveys other district court decisions concerning the modification
provision. The goal of Part III is to provide a foundational understanding
of the prior judicial understanding of the modification provision.
Accordingly, all of the decisions in Part III were made prior to the Federal
Circuit’s Eli Lilly v. Teva decision. Part IV of this article discusses the
legal significance of the Eli Lilly v. Teva decision and argues that the
Federal Circuit’s decision was inadequate. Part V of this article concludes
that the Federal Circuit’s deceptively simple Eli Lilly v. Teva decision is a
harbinger with substantial ramifications for Hatch-Waxman jurisprudence.
I. INTRODUCTION TO THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT
[3]
In 1984 Congress passed the Drug Price Competition and Patent
Term Restoration Act (commonly known as the “Hatch-Waxman Act”).6

4

See id.

5

Eli Lilly, 557 F.3d at 1348–51.

6

Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. and 35
U.S.C.).

2
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The goal of the Hatch-Waxman Act was to balance protections for
patented pharmaceutical drugs with improved market access for less
expensive generic drugs.7
[4]
Prior to enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic
pharmaceutical manufacturers had to file full New Drug Applications
(NDA), which required the generic manufacturer to perform the same
intensive clinical trials that pioneer pharmaceutical manufacturers
complete, in order to receive FDA approval to market a new generic drug.8
Generic drug manufacturers also had to wait until the pioneer drug patents
expired before they could begin the time-consuming NDA approval
process.9
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, generic pharmaceutical
manufacturers instead file an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA)
certifying that the generic drug candidate is “bioequivalent” to the FDA
approved pioneer drug product.10 The ANDA process allows a generic
manufacturer to use the drug safety and effectiveness studies that the
pioneer manufacturer submitted for its NDA.11 A generic manufacturer is
7

See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14–15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647,
2647–48; WENDY H. SCHACHT & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE
HATCH-WAXMAN ACT: PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE CHANGES AFFECTING PHARMACEUTICAL
PATENTS (2004); see also Frederick Tong, Comment, Widening the Bottleneck of
Pharmaceutical Patent Exclusivity, 24 WHITTIER L. REV. 775, 804 (2003) (“Although
this compromise has been an uneasy partnership for all parties involved, both sides have
profited enormously.”).
8

See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 16, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2649
(“Prior to 1962, . . . all drugs [must have been] approved as safe before they could be
marketed.”).

9

See, e.g., Holly Soehnge, Note, The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984: Fine-Tuning the Balance Between the Interests of Pioneer and
Generic Drug Manufacturers, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 51, 51 (2003) (citing H.R. REP.
NO. 98-857, pt. 1, at 14–15, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2647–48).
10

U.S. Food & Drug Admin., What are Generic Drugs? (2009), http://www.fda.gov/
Drugs/ResearchForYou/Consumers/BuyingMedicineSafely/UnderstandingGenericDrugs/
ucml44456.htm.

11

See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 557 F.3d 1346, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)).
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also permitted to file an ANDA before the patents for a pioneer drug
expire and to receive FDA approval to market its generic drug upon either
the expiration of all applicable pioneer drug patents or upon a judicial
determination that the pioneer drug’s patents are invalid or not infringed
by the generic’s “bioequivalent” product.12
[5]
Upon filing an NDA, a pioneer drug manufacturer is required to
list the patents that claim its drug product.13 If the NDA receives
approval, the FDA publishes a listing of the drug and its applicable patents
in the publication Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations (commonly known as the “Orange Book”).14 In an ANDA,
the generic manufacturer is required to include a statement with one of
four different certifications (known as “paragraph certifications”) with
respect to each patent listed in the Orange Book for the “bioequivalent”
NDA product.15 The four possible paragraph certifications are:
(i) that such patent information has not been filed,
(ii) that such patent has expired,
(iii) [that the generic does not seek to enter the market
until] the date on which such patent will expire, or

12

See generally id. at 1348–49; Sobel et al., supra note 3, at 184–85.

13

21 C.F.R. §§ 314.53(a)–(b)(1) (2009); see also Stephanie Greene, A Prescription for
Change: How the Medicare Act Revises Hatch-Waxman To Speed Market Entry of
Generic Drugs, 30 J. CORP. L. 309, 316 (2005).
14

U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPROVED DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC
EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS iv (2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/
Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/UCM071436.pdf. The FDA does not evaluate the
strength or validity of patents in the Orange Book. See id.
15
See, e.g., Steven J. Lee et al., Waxman-Hatch Litigation from the Perspective of the
Generic Pharmaceutical Industry, in PATENT LITIGATION STRATEGIES HANDBOOK, supra
note 3, at 149, 152–53.
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(iv) that such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by
the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the
application is submitted.16
When an ANDA includes a paragraph IV certification that a patent is
invalid or will not be infringed by the ANDA product, the ANDA filer
must notify the NDA holder to provide the NDA holder with an
opportunity to file a patent infringement action.17
[6]
A paragraph IV certification creates an artificial act of patent
infringement.18 Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, a pioneer pharmaceutical
company has forty-five days from the receipt of a paragraph IV notice in
which to file an infringement suit.19 If the pioneer manufacturer brings a
patent infringement action against the ANDA filer within the forty-five
day window, the statutory thirty-month stay on the FDA’s approval of the
ANDA product immediately takes effect.20 The statutory stay lasts for
either thirty months or until the date that the infringement suit is resolved,
whichever occurs first.21 The generic ANDA filer is barred from bringing
a declaratory judgment action against the patent holders, typically the
pioneer manufacturer, during the forty-five day notice window.22 If the
pioneer manufacturer does not file an infringement action within forty-five
days of receipt, the FDA may approve the ANDA.23 A pioneer
manufacturer may still bring an infringement action against the ANDA

16

21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A) (2006).

17

Id. § 355(b)(3)(C).

18

See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii); cf. Glaxo Group Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., 376 F.3d 1339, 1351
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (discussing 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)).
19

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).

20

See id. §§ 355(c)(3)(C), (j)(5)(B)(iii).

21

Id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).

22

Id. § 355(c)(3)(D)(i)(I)(aa).

23

See id. § 355(c)(3)(C).
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filer after the forty-five day period has elapsed, but filing suit at that time
will no longer impose a stay on the FDA’s approval or prevent the market
entry of the ANDA product.24 Suffice it to say, it is very rare that an NDA
holder will not file an infringement action within the forty-five day
window in order to secure the automatic thirty-month stay.25
1. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE THIRTY-MONTH STAY
[7]
The reason Congress chose to make thirty months the length of the
statutory Hatch-Waxman stay remains unknown.26 The Hatch-Waxman
Act and its subsequent amendments were heavily lobbied.27 “The
legislative history indicates that the thirty-month stay was a hard-won
compromise between brand-name manufacturers, generics manufacturers,
and other stakeholders.”28 On the one hand, because the provisions of the
Hatch-Waxman Act were so heavily disputed, the legislative intent behind

24

See id. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).

25

See Matthew Avery, Note, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act by
Pharmaceutical Patent Holders and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS
L.J. 171, 177–78 (2008) (“The purpose of the thirty-month stay is to protect NDA
holders with valid drug patents.”).
26

See, e.g., Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on
the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 187 (1999) (“There is a
paucity of legislative history on the Hatch-Waxman Act.”).
27

See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 tit. XI,
Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C)(i)
and 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(5)). The pioneer pharmaceutical industry was the leading
industry campaign contributor in the 2002 election year, prior to the enactment of the
2003 Amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act. The generic drug industry, which did not
lag far behind, was one of the top ten industry campaign contributors that year. See, e.g.,
Center for Responsive Politics, Pharmaceuticals/Health Products: Long-Term
Contribution Trends, http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/indus.php?ind=H04 (last
visited Nov. 10, 2009).
28

Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 557 F.3d 1346, 1354 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(Prost, J., dissenting).

6
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specific provisions of the Act is often unclear.29 On the other hand, there
is strong evidence in the legislative history that, in creating a thirty-month
stay, Congress intended for generic drug manufacturers to have the
opportunity to launch their product at-risk in the later stages of most
infringement trials.30
[8]
The only legislative history on the modification provision is a
statement in the House Report: “Each party to a patent infringement suit is
charged to reasonably cooperate in expediting the action. Failure by either
party to cooperate in a reasonable manner may be used by the court to
reduce or lengthen the time, as appropriate, before an ANDA approval
becomes effective.”31 The House version of the bill originally provided
for an FDA stay of only eighteen months.32 The House Report cites
findings that the median time between filing and disposition of a patent
suit was thirty-six months, and that ten percent of cases take more than
seventy-seven months.33 The House Report contains language that a
proposed amendment that would stay FDA approval until after a court
29

For example, the Supreme Court has stated: “No interpretation we have been able to
imagine could transform § 271(e)(1) into an elegant piece of statutory draftsmanship. To
construe it as the Court of Appeals decided, one must posit a good deal of legislative
imprecision . . . .” Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 679 (1990) (deciding
that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s decision, which assumed legislative
imprecision, was the best statutory interpretation available); see also Mossinghoff, supra
note 27.

30

See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 10 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686,
2694. An at-risk launch means that the generic manufacturer will be liable for damages if
it proceeds to market its product and the court subsequently finds the patent valid and
infringed. See generally Sobel et al., supra note 3, at 198–99.
31

Id. at 16, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2700.

32

Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, H.R. 3605, 98th
Cong. § 101 (1984); H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 9–10 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2693-94 (“This [eighteen-month] provision was added by the
Committee on Energy and Commerce to accommodate the competing concerns of the
PMA and the generic manufacturers. . . . The generic manufacturers . . . were willing to
live with an eighteen-month rule because of other provisions of the bill.”).
33

H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 10, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2694.
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verdict of invalidity was inadvisable because it would “substantially delay
generics from getting onto the market” and potentially discourage generics
from challenging the validity of a pioneer drug patent.34 The House
Report further states that such an amendment was unnecessary because a
patent holder can recover damages if the generic manufacturer launches an
infringing product after the FDA stay expires.35
[9]
The House Report strongly suggests that provision of the statutory
stay was not done solely to delay generic market entry and that the stay
was not intended to last through most infringement trials.36 The House
arguably designed the stay to encourage pioneer manufacturers to pursue a
speedy trial resolution.
[10] In the end, it was the Senate’s proposal for a thirty-month stay that
triumphed.37 But it is important to note that even the thirty-month stay
was still six months less than the congressional finding for the median
length of a patent infringement suit.38 The takeaway message is that:
It is important to remember that the purpose of the
thirty-month stay is not necessarily to extend the patent
holder’s monopoly, but to create an adequate window of
time during which to litigate the question of whether a
generic will infringe the patented product, without actually
having to introduce the generic product to the market.39

34

Id.

35

Id.

36

See id. at 9–10, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2693–94.

37

See, e.g., Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, S. 2926,
98th Cong. § 101 (1984).

38

H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 10, reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2694.

39

Ben Venue Labs., Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 146 F. Supp. 2d 572, 579 (D.N.J.
2001) (citing to Senator Hatch’s and Representative Waxman’s statements in the
Congressional Record).

8
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While it is not fully clear why Congress chose a period of thirty months or
why it included the modification provision in the Hatch-Waxman Act, the
legislative history reveals that the thirty-month stay was not intended to
function purely as a mechanism for preventing generic market entry
during an infringement lawsuit, but rather was created as an integral part
of a larger statutory scheme aimed at promoting generic market entry.40 In
settling on a thirty-month stay and including the modification provision,
Congress most likely sought to balance a fair period of time for
conducting a trial without the risk of generic market entry against an
appreciation of the risk that too long of a statutory stay period would
create incentives for parties to unnecessarily delay the trial date until the
end of the stay period.41
2. PIONEER MANUFACTURER INCENTIVES FOR DELAY
[11] The statutory thirty-month stay is of tremendous financial value to
pioneer pharmaceutical companies.42 During the statutory stay period, a
pioneer manufacturer remains in complete control of the product market
regardless of the strength of its patents.43 Because there is always some
risk of losing at trial, a pioneer manufacturer does not want to hold trial
until the end of the thirty-month statutory stay period. A pioneer
pharmaceutical company has strong market incentives to extend the thirty-

40

See Narinder S. Banait, Antitrust Issues and the Hatch-Waxman Act, IPFRONTLINE,
Nov. 11, 2005, http://www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.asp?id=7181&deptid=4.

41

Because the statutory stay period also terminates on the date that a court finds the
patent invalid or not infringed, generic manufacturers (usually) have strong interests in
pursuing quick lawsuits. See, e.g., Lee et al., supra note 16, at 162.

42

See Robert E. Colletti, The Role of the Food and Drug Attorney in Hatch-Waxman
Lawsuits, in Inside the Minds: Food and Drug Law Settlements and Negotiations (2006),
available
at
http://www.flhlaw.com/files/Publication/bcc5610d-419a-4ee2-b46a293235ebd8e5/Preview/PublicationAttachment/dd3abe66-7e12-4c62-8e23-2a9ef2bb3503
/CollettiBookChapter . pdf.
43

See FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN
FTC STUDY 14 (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/genericdrugstudy.pdf.

9

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVI, Issue 2

month statutory stay, or further delay generic market entry by any means
possible.44
[12] Prior to the 2003 Hatch-Waxman Amendments, pioneer
pharmaceutical companies were able to secure more than one statutory
stay for the same drug product.45 Companies accomplished this by listing
a new patent in the Orange Book after the first thirty-month stay against
the generic defendant became effective.46 One example of this type of
behavior occurred in Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Biovail Corp.47 In
Andrx, the pioneer manufacturer Biovail licensed a new patent,
reformulated its drug product to fall within this new patent, and listed the
new patent in the Orange Book for its drug after the generic defendant
Andrx was successful at trial against the pioneer’s primary drug patent.48
This newly listed patent resulted in a second infringement trial with
another thirty-month statutory stay against the defendant’s ANDA
product.49 The second trial was assigned to the same district court judge,
William P. Dimitrouleas, who had heard the first trial.50 Dimitrouleas
used the modification provision to shorten the second statutory stay.51 On
appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed, holding that the district court’s

44

See Sarah E. Eurek, Hatch-Waxman Reform and Accelerated Market Entry of Generic
Drugs: Is Faster Necessarily Better?, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 18, ¶¶ 4–5,
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/ dltr/articles/pdf/2003DLTR0018.pdf.

45

See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 44, at iii.

46

Id.

47

175 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (S.D. Fla. 2001), vacated, 276 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Andrx is the only case other than Eli Lilly v. Teva in which the Federal Circuit has
considered the modification provision.
48

See id. at 1365–66.

49

See id. at 1365, 1367.

50

See id. at 1365; Biovail Corp. Int’l v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1320
(S.D. Fla. 2000).
51

See Andrx, 276 F.3d at 1375–76.
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decision to use the modification provision must be based on behavior
before the court, not on behavior before the FDA.52
[13] The outcome in Andrx provided a strong stimulus for the 2003
Amendments. Under the 2003 Amendments, a pioneer manufacturer is
now limited to only one statutory thirty-month stay per ANDA.53 While a
pioneer pharmaceutical manufacturer may sue a generic manufacturer
under a later listed patent, the pioneer manufacturer is not eligible to
receive any additional stay on the FDA approval of an ANDA for patents
listed after the ANDA is first filed.54
[14] The additional statutory stay in Andrx is but one example of the
ways in which pioneer pharmaceutical companies have become very
skillful at advantageously using the provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act
to keep generic competition off the market.55 As one commenter has
stated: “The Hatch-Waxman Amendments increased generic drug entry in
the market, but they were also vulnerable to abuse by brand-name
manufacturers. The terms of the original Hatch-Waxman Amendments

52

See id.

53

See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub.
L. No. 108-173, § 1101, 117 Stat. 2066, 2448–57 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §
355(j)(5)(B)(iv) (2006)).
54

See id.

55

See, e.g., Yana Pechersky, Note, To Achieve Closure of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s
Loopholes, Legislative Action Is Unnecessary: Generic Manufacturers Are Able To Hold
Their Own, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 775, 777 (2007) (“While this amendment
eliminated the practice by brand name manufacturers of using a string of thirty-month
stays to keep generic entrants off the market, it did not address the remaining
loopholes.”); Beth Understahl, Note, Authorized Generics: Careful Balance Undone, 16
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 355, 378 (2005) (“The history of the HatchWaxman Amendments clearly demonstrates that innovators will exploit loopholes in the
statutory language to squeeze out as much market share as possible when faced with
generic competition.”); see also Natalie M. Derzko, The Impact of Recent Reforms of the
Hatch-Waxman Scheme on Orange Book Strategic Behavior and Pharmaceutical
Innovation, 45 IDEA 165, 175–203 (2005).
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created incentives for anticompetitive behavior.” 56 Current examples of
pioneer manufacturer tactics to delay generic market entry include
frivolous claims of patent infringement,57 authorized generics,58 and
collusive settlements between pioneers and generic companies.59
[15] According to another commenter: “The goals of the Act . . . are
threatened by clever market players who find ways to avoid the give-andtake required to make the Act work.”60 With its current broad and highly
deferential reading of the modification provision, the Federal Circuit has
created a new area of uncertainty in the Act that pioneer companies can
exploit to their advantage in delaying generic market entry.

56

Understahl, supra note 55, at 367–68.

57

When the primary patent(s) are set to expire, a manufacturer will often list, and then
file suit under, new patents that have little to do with the basic functioning of the drug
product. “Evergreening” is the practice of extending a patent monopoly by means of a
later more peripheral patent. See, e.g., Tong, supra note 6, at 788 (“While the practice of
evergreening itself is legitimate, pioneer drug companies can abuse the system by
patenting virtually every aspect of their drug, including product, process, use, formulation
and even tablet shape. By staggering every possible patentable aspect of the drug down
to formulation and tablet size, the lifetime of a pioneer drug’s exclusive marketing can be
significantly extended.”).
58

An authorized generic is a “generic” product manufactured by the pioneer
manufacturer or its authorized licensee. Authorized generics are legal, and entitled to
share the market during the first ANDA filer’s 180-day exclusivity period. Authorized
generics may work to deter the market entry of generic ANDA products. See generally
Christopher S. Ponder, Comment, The Dubious Value of Hatch-Waxman Exclusivity, 45
HOUS. L. REV. 555, 571–79 (2008) (assessing whether authorized generics are
anticompetitive).
59

See, e.g., C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1568 (2006).
60

Kristin E. Behrendt, The Hatch-Waxman Act: Balancing Competing Interests or
Survival of the Fittest?, 57 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 247, 270 (2002).
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II. THE FACTS OF ELI LILLY & CO. V. TEVA PHARMACEUTICALS USA, INC.61
[16] Eli Lilly and Company sells raloxifene hydrochloride under the
brand name Evista.62 Evista is approved for treatment of postmenopausal
osteoporosis and prevention of breast cancer.63 On May 16, 2006, Teva
Pharmaceuticals USA notified Eli Lilly that it had filed an ANDA with
paragraph IV certifications for raloxifene.64 Eli Lilly subsequently filed
suit on June 29, 2006, in the Southern District of Indiana, alleging that
Teva infringed four of the twelve patents listed in the Orange Book for
Evista.65 The statutory thirty-month stay against approval of Teva’s
ANDA was immediately effective and would expire on November 16,
2008.66 The district court entered a scheduling order with a discovery
deadline of August 18, 2008, and a trial date of March 9, 2009.67 During
discovery, Teva first provided Eli Lilly with samples of its proposed
ANDA product.68 In February 2007, Eli Lilly amended its complaint to

61

See Case History Timeline infra Addendum (supplementing facts of Eli Lilly & Co. v.
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-1017, 2008 WL 4809963, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 29,
2008)) [hereinafter Case History Timeline for Eli Lilly v. Teva].
62

See id.

63

U.S.
Food
and
Drug
Administration,
Electronic
Orange
Book,
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/ scripts/cder/ob/default.cfm (last visited Nov. 10, 2009)
(searching by proprietary name “Evista”).
64

See Case History Timeline for Eli Lilly v. Teva, supra note 61.

65

See id. By the date of the infringement trial, there were sixteen patents listed in the
Orange Book for Evista. See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, Electronic Orange
Book, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/default.cfm (last visited Nov. 10,
2009) (searching by proprietary name “Evista”).
66

See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-1017, 2008 WL 4809963,
at *1 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 29, 2008).

67

See id. at *1 & n.2.

68

See Corrected Non-Confidential Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee Eli Lilly & Co. at 3–6, Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 2009-1071 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 22, 2008), 2008
WL 5550616 [hereinafter Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee].
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assert Teva infringed three additional patents covering Evista’s particle
size and formulation.69
[17] On July 8, 2008, Teva amended its ANDA with the FDA to
include a new particle size measuring methodology for the active
pharmaceutical ingredient in its proposed raloxifene tablets.70 Two days
later, Teva informed Eli Lilly of this amendment.71 Teva provided three
batch samples of its amended ANDA product to Eli Lilly, the first on July
28, 2008, the second on August 19, 2008, and the third on September 17,
2008.72 From July through September 2008, Teva provided Eli Lilly with
27,000 pages of documentation related to its new particle size measuring
methodology.73 It is important to note that Teva delivered two of the
batch sample products and produced some of the related documents after
the August 18, 2008 discovery deadline, which was set almost two years
earlier, in September 2006.74
[18] Eli Lilly subsequently filed a motion in September 2008 requesting
that the Southern District of Indiana extend the statutory thirty-month
FDA stay on approval of Teva’s ANDA.75 Judge Sarah Evans Barker
granted Eli Lilly’s motion to extend the stay until the start of trial on
March 9, 2009, a period of approximately four months after the scheduled
thirty-month expiration date of the stay.76 Evista had $1.076 billion in

69

See id.; see generally Complaint, Eli Lilly, 2009 WL 3060227 (No. 1:06-CV-1017).

70

Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 68, at 6–13.

71

Id.

72

Id.

73

Id.

74

See id. at 6–13, 25–29.

75

Id. at 13–17.

76

Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-1017, 2008 WL 4809963, at
*2 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 29, 2008). On October 6, 2008, Eli Lilly also filed motions for a
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sales for 2008.77 Accordingly, the decision to extend the FDA stay
approximately four months was potentially worth hundreds of millions of
dollars to Eli Lilly.
[19] The basis for the decision by Judge Barker to extend the statutory
FDA stay against Teva deserves attention for a couple of reasons. First,
under the 2003 Hatch-Waxman Amendments, Eli Lilly was not entitled to
a second statutory stay for the four patents it added to its complaint in
February 2007.78 Teva’s FDA amendment and belated product and
document production all related to these later added patents. Second,
under Andrx, the district court could not consider Teva’s ANDA
amendment—legitimate conduct before the FDA—in its determination of
whether Teva “failed to reasonably cooperate in expediting the action.”79
Therefore, the fact that Teva engaged in discovery production after the
discovery deadline is the only logical basis the district court could use to
support a finding that Teva had “failed to reasonably cooperate in
expediting the action” and, consequently, extend the statutory FDA stay
against Teva’s ANDA.80 The district court’s opinion prominently relied
on Eli Lilly’s arguments that Teva had “failed to reasonably cooperate in
the action” by submitting some of its new product samples and related
documentation after the August 18, 2008 discovery deadline.81 But the

temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary injunction to prevent Teva from
launching its product on or after the November 16, 2008 expiration of the stay. See id. at
*2 n.5.
77

Press Release, Eli Lilly & Co., Lilly Reports Fourth-Quarter and Full-Year 2008
Results (Jan. 29, 2009), available at http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/LLY/
589013876x0x268802/086c5a30-2bfb-4353-8e81-be50b8f17b19/
LLY_News_2009_
1_29_Financial.pdf.
78

Non-Confidential Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. at 1–4,
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 2009-1071 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 30, 2008),
2008 WL 5550617 [hereinafter Brief of Defendant-Appellant].

79

See Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1370–80 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

80

Eli Lilly, 2008 WL 4809963, at *1–2.

81

See id.
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district court never stated that Teva’s discovery delays were severe enough
to satisfy the statutory requirement: “fail[ure] to reasonably cooperate in
expediting the action.”82
Instead, the district court’s conclusions
supporting its ruling relied on evidence that Teva’s behavior related to
recasting its product caused Eli Lilly to need more time to prepare for the
trial.83
[20] The most interesting fact of the case is that the originally
scheduled March 9, 2009 trial date never moved.84 It is hard to connect a
finding that the defendant’s behavior caused the pioneer plaintiff to need
more time to prepare for trial with the solution of a stay on FDA
approval—effectively a preliminary injunction—in the absence of a
corresponding stay on the litigation. While it is not necessary to alter the
trial date to warrant use of the modification provision by the district court,
there should have at least been a finding that the defendant’s behavior was
on a level that would warrant staying the litigation. Otherwise, the fact
that there was no delay in the litigation suggests that the court was using
the modification provision as a “punishment” mechanism for a discovery
delay, instead of for its intended purpose.85
[21] Because the statutory stay is equivalent to injunctive relief, the
Federal Circuit took the Eli Lilly v. Teva case on interlocutory appeal
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).86 On February 24, 2009, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the Southern District of Indiana’s decision to use the

82

Brief of Defendant-Appellant, supra note 78, at 1–4.

83

See Eli Lilly, 2008 WL 4809963, at *2.

84

See id.

85

Henry Lebowitz, Remarks at Columbia Law School Advanced Patents Seminar (Apr.
16, 2009).

86

See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 557 F.3d 1346, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
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modification provision to extend the FDA stay against Teva’s ANDA until
the start of the infringement trial.87
III. DISTRICT COURT DECISIONS CONCERNING THE MODIFICATION
PROVISION PRIOR TO THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S RULING IN ELI LILLY V. TEVA
[22] Prior to the Federal Circuit’s recent ruling, there have been nine
district court decisions—other than Eli Lilly v. Teva—related to the
modification provision.88 Moreover, excluding the Southern District of
Indiana and the Southern District of Florida’s decision, which was
overturned by the Federal Circuit in Andrx, only two district courts have
been willing to exercise their power to modify the statutory thirty-month

87

Id. at 1351. Interestingly, on April 22, 2009, Judge Barker granted a renewed motion
for preliminary injunction in favor of Eli Lilly. The April 2009 preliminary injunction
prevented Teva from launching its generic product until there was a final trial ruling on
the merits of the infringement suit. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 609
F.Supp.2d 786, 790-812 (S.D. Ind. 2009); see also Press Release, Eli Lilly & Co., Lilly
Granted Preliminary Injunction to Prevent Launch of Generic Raloxifene (Apr. 22, 2009),
available
at
http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/LLY/784741347x0x289245/
8d085039-0f56-4397-823a-45ad2ee83dc2/LLY_News_2009_4_22_Corporate.pdf. The
fact that Judge Barker later granted Eli Lilly a preliminary injunction supports this
article’s argument that a preliminary injunction, and not the modification provision, was
the more appropriate legal analysis for determining whether or not to prevent Teva from
launching its generic raloxifene product at the time the original thirty-month FDA stay
expired.
88

Based on an extensive search of Westlaw, LexisNexis, and the Stanford IP Litigation
Clearinghouse website (available at http://lexmachina.stanford.edu). See generally
Glaxo, Inc. v. TorPharm, Inc., No. 95 C 4686, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12816 (N.D. Ill.
Aug. 20, 1997); Zeneca Ltd. v. Pharmachemie B.V., 16 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D. Mass. 1998);
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharms., Inc., No. IP 99-38-C H/G, 2001 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2728 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 8, 2001); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Alphapharm Party
Ltd., No. Civ. 99-13 MJDLGL, 2002 WL 1299996 (D. Minn. Mar. 8, 2002); Andrx
Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Novartis Corp. v.
Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., No. 04 Civ. 0757 (SAS), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21094
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2004); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., Cause No. 1:02-CV-1844SEB-VSS (S.D. Ind. May 27, 2005); Dey, L.P. v. Ivax Pharms., Inc., 233 F.R.D. 567
(C.D. Cal. 2005); In re Brimonidine Patent Litig., No. 07-MD-1866, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 92405 (D. Del. Oct. 31, 2008).
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stay under the modification provision.89 The Southern District of New
York granted an extension of the thirty-month FDA stay against a generic
defendant in conjunction with the generic defendant’s motion for a stay on
the litigation.90 The Central District of California granted a request to
shorten the thirty-month stay due to a pioneer plaintiff’s failure to identify
and disclose the inventors of its patent.91
[23] For the most part, the district courts have been reluctant to exercise
their discretionary power under the modification provision.92 The
Northern District of Illinois, the District of Massachusetts, the District of
Minnesota, and the District of Delaware have each denied a motion to
modify the statutory thirty-month FDA stay as not warranted.93 These
courts have tended to recognize that some natural give-and-take exists in
the discovery process, and have each concluded that the fact that a party
has committed some delay does not mean that the party has necessarily
“failed to reasonably cooperate in expediting the action.”94
[24] The Southern District of Indiana is currently an outlier in how
liberally it interprets the modification provision and how frequently it
grants requests for modification of the statutory FDA stay.95 The Southern

89

See Novartis Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21094; Dey, L.P. v. Eon Labs, Inc., No.
SACV 04-00243 CJC (FMOx), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39475 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2005).
90

Novartis Corp., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21094, at *14–15.

91

Eon Labs, Inc., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39475, at *2–3.

92

As one commenter notes, this is “perhaps because courts have been unwilling to blame
one party exclusively for failure to cooperate.” David Bickart, The Hatch-Waxman Act,
in DEVELOPMENTS IN PHARMACEUTICAL AND BIOTECH PATENT LAW 205, 247 (2008).
93

Glaxo, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12816, at *23; Zeneca Ltd., 16 F. Supp. 2d at 113;
Minn. Mining, 2002 WL 1299996, at *6; In re Brimonidine Patent Litig., 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 92405, at *13.
94

Minn. Mining, 2002 WL 1299996, at *2.

95

See generally Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharms., Inc., No. IP 99-38-C H/G,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2728 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 8, 2001).
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District of Indiana has now granted motions to extend the statutory thirtymonth stay in three different cases, all of which have involved Eli Lilly
and Company as the plaintiff and an alleged discovery failure against
(what is now) three different generic defendants.96
1. GLAXO, INC. V. TORPHARM, INC.
[25] In 1997, the Northern District of Illinois was the first court to rule
on 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(B)(iii)’s modification provision.97 In the case,
the generic defendant TorPharm sought to shorten the thirty-month
statutory stay by five months.98 The Northern District of Illinois found
that TorPharm’s contentions that pioneer manufacturer plaintiff Glaxo was
still delivering requested discovery documents two months after the close
of discovery and that TorPharm had needed to file four motions to compel
in order to obtain documents that Glaxo had promised to produce in
discovery responses were both true.99 The court nevertheless denied
TorPharm’s request to shorten the stay.100
[26] The Northern District of Illinois concluded that Glaxo’s discovery
delays were not sufficient behavior to warrant shortening the statutory
thirty-month stay.101 The district court’s “overall impression of this case
during the discovery phase [was] that both parties conducted a tremendous
amount of discovery within a relatively short period of time.”102 The court

96

See generally Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 557 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir.
2009); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., Cause No. 1:02-CV-1844-SEB-JMS (S.D. Ind.
May 27, 2005); Zenith Goldline Pharms., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2728.
97

See generally Glaxo, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12816.

98

Id. at *5.

99

Id. at *9.

100

Id. at *10.

101

Id. at *7–10.

102

Id. at *8.
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concluded that, even though “Glaxo was untimely in its document
productions,” modification of the statutory stay was not appropriate
because Glaxo had “nonetheless cooperated in moving along this
litigation.”103 The Northern District of Illinois’s decision in Glaxo is
interesting because, while failure to reasonably cooperate is admittedly a
very factual determination, the decision is contrary to the conclusion
reached by the district court in Eli Lilly v. Teva.
2. ZENECA LTD. V. PHARMACHEMIE B.V.
[27] In 1998, the District of Massachusetts first considered a motion to
extend the statutory thirty-month FDA stay.104 The court denied the
motion.105 The opinion simply states that 21 U.S.C. § 335(j)(5)(B)(iii)
imposes an “affirmative duty [on the parties] to ‘reasonably cooperate in
expediting the action’” and that “the record shows that the defendant has
cooperated reasonably in expediting this action.”106 This decision is one
of the only officially published district court decisions regarding the
modification provision, but the opinion is too pithy to provide much in
terms of worthwhile precedent.
3. ELI LILLY & CO. V. ZENITH GOLDLINE PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.
[28] In 2001, the Southern District of Indiana was the first court to
exercise its power under the modification provision.107 The court
extended the statutory stay until entry of a final judgment in the
infringement action.108 Interestingly, the case plaintiff, who filed for
103

Id. at *9–10.

104

See generally Zeneca Ltd. v. Pharmachemie B.V., 16 F. Supp. 2d 112 (D. Mass.
1998).
105

Id. at 113.

106

Id.

107

See generally Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharms., Inc., No. IP 99-38-C H/G,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2728 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 8, 2001).
108

Id. at *2.
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extension of the stay, was Eli Lilly and Company.109 The court found that
generic defendant Zenith Goldline “failed to reasonably cooperate in
expediting this action by failing to meet the case management deadline for
serving its expert witness reports on the central issue of the case—
invalidity.”110 Under the case management plan, the expert reports were
due ninety days before trial.111 Zenith Goldline was unable to produce the
reports at that time, stating that the reports would be available
approximately thirty days before trial.112 The court held that Zenith
Goldline’s failure to meet the discovery deadline for the expert reports
was sufficient to trigger an extension of the statutory FDA stay because
the reports were “on the critical path of this trial schedule.”113
[29] In Eli Lilly v. Zenith Goldline, the Southern District of Indiana was
the first court to hold that the modification provision of the HatchWaxman Act applied to dilatory discovery tactics.114 The plaintiff,
jurisdiction, and facts in Eli Lilly v. Zenith Goldline parallel the
circumstances in the Eli Lilly v. Teva case. A key difference between the
cases, however, is that the Zenith Goldline court had previously granted
Eli Lilly a motion based on Zenith Goldline’s discovery delays to continue
the trial by approximately four months.115 Arguably, Zenith Goldline’s
behavior was more severe, and its discovery delay was less excusable than
Teva’s behavior in the more recent Eli Lilly v. Teva case.

109

Id.

110

Id.

111

Id. at *3.

112

Id.

113

Id. at *4.

114

Id. at *2–3.

115

See id. at *2.
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4. MINNESOTA MINING & MANUFACTURING CO. V. ALPHAPHARM PARTY LTD.
[30] Minnesota Mining was another case where the generic defendant
made evidentiary submissions after the deadlines for expert reports and
discovery set forth in the scheduling order.116 The thirty-month stay had
expired and the generic defendant Alphapharm was preparing to make an
at-risk launch of its product.117 The pioneer plaintiff 3M filed motions
both to extend the statutory thirty-month stay and for a preliminary
injunction.118 The District of Minnesota denied both motions.119 The
court held that Alphapharm’s submissions were “not untimely” due to “the
complexity of the issues involved.”120 The court determined that, if 3M
wanted to extend the statutory stay, 3M would have to seek and secure a
preliminary injunction.121 3M’s motion for a preliminary injunction was
denied because it could not establish irreparable harm.122 The court stated
that any potential injury could be easily measured in monetary terms and
remedied with money damages.123
5. ANDRX PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. V. BIOVAIL CORP.
[31] In 2000, the Southern District of Florida ruled that generic
defendant Andrx’s ANDA for a generic version of pioneer plaintiff
Biovail’s drug Tiazac did not infringe Biovail’s patents.124 However,
116

Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Alphapharm Party Ltd., No. Civ. 99-13 MJDLGL, 2002
WL 1299996, at *3 (D. Minn. Mar. 8, 2002).
117

Id. at *2.

118

Id.

119

Id. at *6.

120

Id. at *3.

121

Id.

122

Id. at *3–5.

123

Id.

124

Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2001).
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before Andrx could market its drug, Biovail licensed a patent for an
extended release formulation of the active ingredient in Tiazac and listed
this new patent with the FDA.125 Biovail then filed suit against Andrx
under the new patent, triggering a second thirty-month stay against
Andrx’s ANDA.126 There was strong suspicion that Biovail’s second
lawsuit was frivolous and that Biovail’s listing of the extended release
formulation patent was a sham designed solely to use the thirty-month stay
provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act to keep Andrx off the market.127
[32] The Southern District of Florida transferred the second case as a
related case to the same judge who had heard the first case.128 The district
court decided that Biovail’s actions in listing the new patent were clearly
“done to impede or delay the expeditious resolution of the patent actions,”
and the court exercised its power under the modification provision to
terminate Biovail’s second thirty-month statutory stay against Andrx’s
ANDA.129 The court justified its authority under the modification
provision stating, “[I]t is clear that this Court was given express authority
in the Hatch-Waxman Act to police the Congressional compromise
between patent protections for the pioneer drug maker and the public’s
need for speedy approval of safe lower-cost generic equivalents to those
drugs.”130 The Federal Circuit reversed,131 holding that the modification

125

See Biovail Corp. Int’l v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 158 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1330 (S.D. Fla.
2000), aff’d, 239 F.3d 1297 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

126

Id. at 1328.

127

See id.

128

See id. at 1320; Andrx, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 1365.

129

Andrx, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 1375.

130

Id.

131

Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1370–80 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act did not allow the district court to
consider behavior before the FDA.132
6. NOVARTIS CORP. V. DR. REDDY’S LABS., LTD.
[33] In Novartis v. Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, the Southern District of
New York extended the thirty-month stay in conjunction with granting a
motion by the generic defendant Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories to stay the
litigation.133 The litigation involved the FDA’s stay of approval of one of
the ingredients in an application for combination capsules with two drug
ingredients that worked synergistically.134
The court found the
defendant’s request to stay the litigation was warranted because it would
simplify the issues and promote judicial economy, but that extension of
the thirty-month stay on FDA approval of the combination drug product
was necessary to ensure that pioneer plaintiff Novartis would not be
disadvantaged by the delay in the litigation proceedings.135 The district
court supported its determination to invoke the modification provision
stating: “[Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories] cannot feasibly argue that it is
reasonably cooperating in expediting the action when it has asked the
court to stay the proceedings.”136 The decision was non-controversial.
While the plaintiff objected to staying the litigation, the defendant did not
object to tolling the thirty-month FDA stay while the infringement
litigation was on hold.137

132

Id. The final case outcome in Biovail v. Andrx is credited as being a major driver
behind the 2003 Hatch-Waxman Amendments, which limited the pioneer manufacturer to
only one thirty-month stay per ANDA.

133

See generally Novartis Corp. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., No. 04 Civ. 0757 (SAS),
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21094 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2004).
134

Id. at *7–8.

135

Id. at *11–13.

136

Id. at *13.

137

See id. at *12–13.
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7. ELI LILLY & CO. V. BARR LABORATORIES, INC.138
[34] The Southern District of Indiana also granted Eli Lilly a limited
extension of the statutory stay in Eli Lilly v. Barr Laboratories.139 In that
case, the generic defendant Barr had failed to provide plaintiff Eli Lilly
with a sample of its product.140 In its order, the court stated that it is
“important, perhaps essential, that the composition of the generic drug
product for which FDA approval is being sought . . . and which Lilly
alleges to be the infringing product should be definitely established.”141
The “order provided that, after the defendant produced the sample, the
stay would extend through a reasonably expeditious time period for
preparing for trial.”142 Most interestingly, Judge Sarah Evans Barker, the
same judge who presided over and issued the statutory extension in Eli
Lilly v. Teva, also issued the extension order in the Eli Lilly v. Barr
case.143
8. DEY, L.P. V. IVAX PHARMS., INC.
[35] The Central District of California is the only court, excluding the
Southern District of Florida’s decision which was reversed by the Federal
Circuit in Andrx, to grant a generic defendant’s motion to shorten the
statutory thirty-month stay and to facilitate generic market entry.144 In
138

Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., Cause No. 1:02-CV-1844-SEB-JMS (S.D. Ind.
May 27, 2005). This Order Granting Limited Extension of Statutory Stay was
unpublished, but nevertheless cited in the district court’s order in Eli Lilly v. Teva.
139

Id.

140

Id. at 1.

141

Id. at 2.

142

Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 1:06-CV-1017, 2008 WL 4809963, at
*2 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 29, 2008) (emphasis added).

143

See id. at *1; Eli Lilly, Cause No. 1:02-CV-1844-SEB-VSS, at 3.

144

Dey, L.P. v. Ivax Pharms., Inc., 233 F.R.D. 567 (C.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d on reh’g sub
nom. Dey, L.P. v. Eon Labs, Inc., No. SACV 04-00243 CJC (FMOx), 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 39475 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2005).

25

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XVI, Issue 2

Dey v. Ivax, the Central District of California granted a motion to
terminate the thirty-month stay145 based upon a finding that the pioneer
plaintiff Dey, L.P. had failed to cooperate in expediting the litigation.146
The court found that Dey had concealed studies comparing its product to a
prior art drug and delayed its disclosure of the proper inventor of the
patent at issue by repeatedly changing its position on inventorship.147 The
court concluded that this behavior evidenced Dey’s failure to cooperate.148
The district court later confirmed and further clarified its decision to
terminate the statutory stay when it subsequently denied Dey’s motion for
reconsideration.149 The court held that pioneer plaintiffs have a duty to
form a good faith opinion on the issue of inventorship at the outset of
litigation.150
There is nothing inconsistent about holding both (1)
that Dey may seek to correct inventorship if new facts
demonstrate a need to do so, and also (2) that Dey
nevertheless should be required to inform itself of the facts
underlying its claims of inventorship early in the action
rather than waiting until the close of evidence at trial to
discover the role played by each of its own current and
former employees in the development of the patented
material.151

145

This was a consolidated motion because Ivax Pharmaceuticals and Eon Labs, Inc.
were both defendants litigating suits against pioneer manufacturer Dey, L.P. relating to
the same pioneer drug. Generic defendant Eon Labs was the party who brought and
succeeded in the motion to shorten the statutory stay on its ANDA product. Id. at 567.
146

Id. at 569–71.

147

Id.

148

Id.

149

Dey, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39475, at *2–3.

150

Id. at *3.

151

Id. at *33–34.
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In the opinion of the Central District of California, a pioneer plaintiff’s
failure to take a solid position on inventorship is alone sufficient grounds
for terminating the thirty-month statutory stay under the modification
provision.152
9. IN RE BRIMONIDINE PATENT LITIGATION
[36] The District of Delaware is a frequent venue for Hatch-Waxman
litigations, but it has still never exercised its power to modify the statutory
thirty-month stay. Further, the District of Delaware has considered the
modification provision only once.153 In that suit, pioneer plaintiff
Allergan requested both to stay the litigation against generic defendant
Exela PharmSci and to toll the thirty-month stay on FDA approval of
Exela’s ANDA.154 Early in the litigation, Exela had joined Paddock and
PharmaForce, two intended partners who were expected to manufacture
Exela’s ANDA product, as defendants to the suit.155 Allergan brought its
motion to stay the action without knowing Exela’s partnership with
Paddock and PharmaForce had dissolved.156 Allergan argued that the
litigation should be stayed because Exela’s ANDA designated Paddock as
the manufacturer and PharmaForce had supplied most of the product
bioequivalence information to the FDA.157 With respect to the thirtymonth FDA stay, Allergan argued that “Exela has: (1) failed to respond
promptly to the FDA’s call for bioequivalence data; (2) suppressed
relevant information; and (3) engaged in dilatory discovery tactics, all in

152

See id. at *1-36.

153

See In re Brimonidine Patent Litig., No. 07-MD-1866, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92405
(D. Del. Oct. 31, 2008).

154

See id. at *1.

155

See id. at *2–3.

156

See id. at *4.

157

See id. at *4 n.3.
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an effort to try to run the clock on Allergan.”158 The district court denied
all of Allergan’s requests.159
[37] The court stated that granting Allegan’s motion to stay the
litigation would be “unduly prejudicial to Exela.”160 The court denied
Allergan’s motion on the grounds that a stay would risk Exela’s first
ANDA filer status (which entitled Exela to a 180-day market exclusivity
period) and delay market entry of the generic product at issue in the
litigation, rather than simplify any issues because the case was relatively
far along.161 With respect to Allergan’s request to toll the thirty-month
stay, the court was “not persuaded” that there was a “sufficient showing to
support a finding that Exela [was] not reasonably cooperating in
expediting this litigation” because the record did not “reflect the type of
dilatory conduct and discovery antics that necessitate such a finding.”162
The district court concluded that the problems associated with “Exela’s
need to identify a new manufacturer, or conduct certain bioequivalence
studies, or submit supplemental product information to the FDA” did not
indicate failure to cooperate with expediting the litigation.163 The District
of Delaware went on to add that “these types of issues are, and should be,
a normal part of the give-and-take associated with the drug approval
process,” before concluding that tolling the stay was not warranted based
on the evidence before the court.164 This decision is particularly
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Id. at *12–13. Allergan made a third request that the court grant it leave to use
information produced by the generic defendants in the case in a citizen’s petition before
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apparent to this court why use of Exela’s confidential information is necessary.”).
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interesting because it occurred during the same week that the Southern
District of Indiana reached its conflicting interpretation of the
modification provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act in Eli Lilly v. Teva.
IV. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S ELI LILLY V. TEVA DECISION
[38] The Federal Circuit’s holding in Eli Lilly v. Teva is potentially
problematic precedent. Currently, Eli Lilly v. Teva is only the second
Federal Circuit decision concerning the modification provision of the
Hatch-Waxman Act.165 In Eli Lilly, the Federal Circuit also confined
Andrx v. Biovail, its prior decision concerning the modification provision,
to Andrx’s unique procedural stance.166 The Eli Lilly decision is now the
de facto case that parties will cite and to which the district courts will look
when they consider motions under the Hatch-Waxman Act’s modification
provision. However, the Federal Circuit’s Eli Lilly v. Teva decision was
unduly deferential to the district court. The Federal Circuit’s decision fails
to provide the district courts with guidance on how to conduct the
“fail[ure] to reasonably cooperate in expediting the action” analysis
required by the Act.167
1. THE MAJORITY HOLDING
[39] The Federal Circuit’s Eli Lilly v. Teva decision was highly
deferential to the district court.168 The court stated that trial courts may
adjust the statutory thirty-month FDA stay based upon the uncooperative
discovery practices of parties before the court.169 The Federal Circuit held
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See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 557 F.3d 1346, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2009);
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that it would only review district court decisions pursuant to the
modification provision for an abuse of discretion.170
[40] The Federal Circuit affirmed Andrx, holding that district courts
may not extend the statutory stay based on filings before the FDA.171 But
it also distinguished Andrx as a case in which the district court considered
behavior wholly unrelated to the issue at hand, and as a situation that
could no longer arise subsequent to the passage of the Hatch-Waxman
Amendments.172 The Federal Circuit determined that the district court’s
decision to extend the stay was not based on Teva’s filing with the FDA
but rather “Teva’s lack of cooperation in expediting the patent litigation in
its court.”173 As such, the decision to extend the thirty-month FDA stay
was a “proper application of the law.”174
2. JUDGE PROST’S DISSENT
[41] In her dissent, Judge Prost argued that the majority both
misapprehended the facts and misapplied the law.175 Prost argued that,
because the issue was one of statutory construction, the court should have
applied a de novo standard of review.176 However, Prost concluded that
the district court’s decision needed to be overturned “even under an abuse
of discretion standard.”177 Prost pointed out that the district court never
made the necessary statutory finding:
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Not once in this order did the court indicate, much
less unambiguously state, that it found Teva had failed to
reasonably cooperate in expediting this action. The court
provided at most two justifications for extending the stay:
(1) to provide Lilly a “sufficient opportunity to identify the
nature and composition of the raloxifene product as Teva
intends for it to be sold,” and (2) to give Lilly “a reasonable
amount of time to allow its expert to test and report on the
altered raloxifene samples provided by Teva and for Lilly
to assess and utilize that information and analysis in
preparation for trial.” Neither of these reasons remotely
resembles the statutorily required finding.178
According to Prost, district court findings should clearly “relate[] [the
party’s] conduct to the statutory standard,” and district court opinion’s
must explain these findings with sufficient reasoning to provide for
meaningful appellate review.179
[42] Prost mentioned the consequences likely to arise from the
majority’s opinion. She reasoned that affirming the district court in this
case would “effectively eliminate the statutorily required finding” and
“prematurely terminate the development of appropriate standards
governing modification under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).”180
3. THE MAJORITY OPINION PROVIDES INADEQUATE
GUIDANCE TO THE DISTRICT COURTS
[43] While the final outcome in Eli Lilly v. Teva is not necessarily
incorrect, the majority opinion is highly problematic because it does not
provide clear guidance on how to apply the modification provision of the
Hatch-Waxman Act. The majority opinion was most likely correct to
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conclude that the proper standard of review was abuse of discretion.181
Further, it is not unthinkable that one might conclude, based on the
evidence of Teva’s late discovery production, that Teva’s behavior met the
statutory standard of failing to reasonably cooperate in expediting the
action. The problem with the Federal Circuit’s majority opinion is that it
glossed over the fact that the district court never explicitly found that Teva
failed to reasonably cooperate in expediting the action.
[44] The Federal Circuit decision creates a risk that district courts will
apply the modification provision to a wide variety of discovery failures,
instead of only to severe discovery failures that meet the statutory
standard. The decision also creates the risk that future court modifications
to the statutory stay period will lack significant correlation between the
length of modification and the amount of delay caused.
[45] The legislative history indicates that Congress had a reason for
setting thirty months as the time length for the stay; Congress did not
intend for the stay to remain in effect throughout the duration of every
infringement trial.182 Congress wanted to provide generic manufacturers
with the opportunity to launch at-risk following expiration of the stay.183
In the absence of legislation clarifying the modification provision, the
Federal Circuit has a duty to ensure that district court applications of the
modification provision adhere to the terms of the statute. The Federal
Circuit should set precedent that, when faced with a motion under the
modification provision, a district court must first evaluate whether a
party’s behavior constitutes a failure to reasonably cooperate. The district
court must then determine whether this behavior resulted, or is likely to
result, in delaying the trial. Finally, upon satisfaction of both conditions,
the district court must consider what length of modification is appropriate
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Abuse of discretion is the accepted standard for a preliminary injunction, which is
effectively the same form of relief. See generally Abbott Labs. v. Sandoz, Inc., 566 F.3d
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to remedy the delay caused. To allow modification of the thirty-month
statutory stay using a more cursory analysis (such as the one used by the
district court in Eli Lilly v. Teva) is dangerous because of the substantial
real-world repercussions associated with the timing of the FDA’s approval
of an ANDA.
V. CONCLUSION
[46] The Federal Circuit’s decision in Eli Lilly v. Teva is problematic
because it fails to provide the district courts with clear guidance on how to
interpret and apply the modification provision of the Hatch-Waxman Act.
Because it both affirmed the extension of a statutory FDA stay for a
relatively minimal discovery delay and failed to delineate clear boundaries
for the allowable use of the modification provision, the Federal Circuit’s
Eli Lilly v. Teva decision is likely to result in a significant increase in the
number of motions for modification of the statutory thirty-month stay on
FDA approval of an ANDA. Pioneer pharmaceutical plaintiffs, in
particular, will now file greater numbers of motions to extend the statutory
stay. This increase in motions will spark a corollary increase in court
decisions to shorten or extend the statutory thirty-month stay.
[47] In the wake of Eli Lilly v. Teva, the district courts are likely to vary
in their interpretations and applications of the modification provision.
Some districts will be more liberal both in the frequency that they decide
to modify statutory FDA stays and in the time durations for the FDA stay
adjustments that they make. Because of the large, real-world monetary
value associated with the extension of a thirty-month FDA stay on ANDA
approval, a lack of standardization amongst the district courts relating to
their understanding and application of the modification provision could
lead to significant forum shopping by pioneer pharmaceutical plaintiffs.
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ADDENDUM
Timeline of the Case History for
Eli Lilly & Co. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.
2006
May
Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. filed an ANDA with the FDA to
manufacture and market generic raloxifene hydrochloride (which
is sold by Eli Lilly under the brand name Evista).
May 16
Teva notified Eli Lilly of its paragraph IV certification.
June 29
Eli Lilly and Company filed a lawsuit against Teva in the Southern
District of Indiana alleging that Teva’s ANDA product infringed
four Evista patents.
The statutory thirty-month stay on FDA approval of Teva’s ANDA
took effect.
September 25
The district court entered a scheduling order, setting a discovery
deadline of August 18, 2008 and a trial date of March 9, 2009.
December
Teva first provided Eli Lilly with a sample of its proposed ANDA
product.
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2007
February
Eli Lilly amended its complaint to assert that Teva infringed three
additional patents related to raloxifene particle size and
formulation.
2008
July 8
Teva amended its ANDA with the FDA to include a new particle
size measuring methodology for the active ingredient in its
proposed raloxifene tablets.
July 10
Teva informed Eli Lilly that it had amended its ANDA.
July 28
Teva provided Eli Lilly with the first batch sample of its amended
ANDA product.
August 18
Original scheduled deadline for discovery.
August 19
Teva provided Eli Lilly with the second batch sample of its
amended ANDA product.
September 5
Teva provided Eli Lilly with the last of 27,000 pages of
documentation related to its new particle size measuring
methodology.
September 17
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Teva provided Eli Lilly with the third batch sample of its amended
ANDA product.
Eli Lilly filed a motion requesting the extension of the statutory
thirty-month stay prohibiting Teva from entering the market with
its generic raloxifene product.
October 6
Eli Lilly filed motions for a temporary restraining order and a
preliminary injunction (both motions were denied as moot).
October 29
The Southern District of Indiana granted Eli Lilly’s motion to
extend the statutory FDA stay. The stay on FDA approval was
extended until the start of trial (March 9, 2009).
November 16
The original statutory thirty-month stay on FDA approval was set
to expire. Teva planned to launch at-risk on this date.
2009
February 24
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to extend
the statutory stay until the start of trial.
March 4
The district court denied Eli Lilly’s request for an additional
extension of the statutory stay on FDA approval.
March 9
Trial began.
The district court entered a temporary restraining order against
Teva. (Teva was planning at-risk launch even on the eve of trial.)
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April 22
The Southern District of Indiana granted a preliminary injunction
in favor of Eli Lilly until a final trial determination is made.
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